

84.60.c.9.

HIERO;
ON THE
CONDITION
OF
ROYALTY.

Price 2s. 6d.



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HIERO;

ON THE

CONDITION OF ROYALTY:

A CONVERSATION,
FROM THE GREEK OF XENOPHON. *R*
BY THE
TRANSLATOR OF ANTONINUS'S MEDITATIONS.

"PRIVATUSQUE MAGIS VIVAM TE REGE BEATUS."

HOR. SAT.



BATH, PRINTED BY R. CRUTTWELL,
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M DCC XCIII.



4

TO

WILLIAM DRAKE, JUNIOR,

ESQUIRE,

MEMBER FOR AMERSHAM, BUCKS.

SIR,

AS you have *permitted* me to prefix your name to this little treatise, but "*unadorned*" with the usual flowers of a dedication, I will not compliment you on your many amiable qualities and truly virtuous and exemplary character.

I will beg leave, however, to mention one laudable peculiarity in *your* conduct.

conduct, (and that of some of your acquaintance) which, though apparently of little moment, would, I am convinced, if more generally adopted, have a very beneficial influence, not only on the *health* of people in the higher ranks of life, but on the *morals* of their inferiors and dependants.

The circumstance which I allude to is, that, on my repeated morning-visits to Portman-square, I have invariably found you risen *before eight* o'clock, and prepared for the important duties and the true enjoyment of life.

These regular hours, if we could hope to see such obsolete customs revived, would probably contribute to give a check to the profligacy, too
visible

visible in the domestics of the higher circles, and thence diffused amongst the lower classes of the people. For, during the nocturnal engagements of their masters, whether in their legislative or in their convivial meetings, and of their ladies in their various midnight assemblies, how or where are their attendants to amuse themselves, but amidst the resorts of vice and licentiousness? And, from the habits there contracted, we may, with probability, trace the origin of the many burglaries and street-robberies which disturb and disgrace the metropolis.

I was much pleased with the account lately given me by a very worthy and ingenious gentleman, who, a few
years

years since, made the tour of Switzerland. Being at Zurich for a few days, he was very desirous to see M. Gesner, the celebrated bucolick writer. He called at his house the evening before he left the place, and, not finding him at home, asked the servant what time in the morning he could probably see his master? "Not at all to-morrow morning," said the man, "as my master is to attend the council at *six* o'clock." "I went however at *five*," said my friend, "and had an hour's conversation with M. Gesner; when, with primitive solemnity, the great bell rang, and the council met."

Ye legislators of Great-Britain! listen to the voice of your country! who
calls

calls upon you, not to devote yourselves to destruction, by rushing into the midst of foes, like Codrus; or to leap into the fiery gulph, like Curtius; but—to *keep better hours*; to rise in the morning before twelve o'clock; nor think the new regulation of the minister, which requires your attendance at *four o'clock in the afternoon*, any infringement of the rights of man. Set the example! and your *ladies* will regulate their hours of pleasure by your hours of business; and by degrees, perhaps, restore the virtuous manners of our sober ancestors.

The morning is friendly to Virtue, as well as to the Muses; and we should hardly prefer the gloomy *darkness* of

a

the

the night to the cheerful *light* of the day; unless our deeds, or our propensities at least, were evil.

Excuse the impertinence, dear Sir, of making this address the vehicle of my crude politicks, and believe me, with great regard,

Your obliged

and obedient servant,

THE TRANSLATOR.

PREFATORY INTRODUCTION.

THE Author of this and several other translations, is apprehensive of being exposed to the same kind of ridicule with Philemon Holland, called "The Translator general," in the last century.*

"Philemon with translations does so fill us,
"He will not let Suetonius be Tranquillus."

* C. Suetonius Tranquillus; his Cognomen: an English reader may say,

'Philemon in translations does so riot,
'He will not let Suetonius rest in *quiet*.'

There

There are probably, however, in every language, ancient and modern, some valuable treatises yet untranslated; which, exclusively of their utility, those who cannot read them in the original, might, from mere curiosity, wish to be acquainted with. Such, according to the best intelligence I can gain, is the present little treatise; which, in the opinion of Peter Coste, (the friend of Mr. Locke) is one of the most perfect of Xenophon's works: though, as he adds, "it is impossible for any translation to express the vivacity, the sweetness, the delicacy, and native simplicity, of the original." And, when we consider that it was written above two thousand

thousand years since, we cannot but be surpris'd to find every material argument on the subject so clearly and concisely express'd, and so methodically and so judiciously dispos'd.

Xenophon indeed was not only one of the greatest generals, a consummate statesman, and profound philosopher, but, by universal consent, one of the finest writers of antiquity; as his works, still extant, sufficiently testify.

His patriotick sentiments on encouraging agriculture, and the useful and the fine arts, by prizes and rewards,^b though so obviously advanta-

^b See chap. xx.

geous, have but within this century been adopted and realized by the enlightened states of Europe.

But to come to the subject of this dialogue, or rather conversation, between Hiero and Simonides, which, like his "Institution of Cyrus," seems to be only an embellished narrative of what either did, or, with the utmost probability, might have passed at the court of Syracuse.

The treatise is called "Hiero, or a Discourse on the Condition of a Tyrant." But every one knows, that the word *tyrant* signified originally no more than a *king*, or *sovereign*, in general. In Xenophon's time, however, it was frequently used in a bad sense;

sense; and towards the middle of this discourse is generally so used.

The distinction indeed between a king and a tyrant is very material; the former rules according to established laws; the latter tramples upon all laws, and rules according to his own arbitrary will. This distinction, tho' so obvious and so generally understood, seems wilfully to be overlooked by our modern patriots, when they confound our limited monarchy, and nicely-balanced constitution, with many of the despotick governments of Europe.

Royalty is a form of government to which many free states have found it adviseable voluntarily to submit; as the republick of Syracuse did to Gelon,

the brother of Hiero. Tyranny is the abuse of all government; but, we should observe, that this *tyranny* may exist in every form of government, in an oligarchy and in a democracy, as well as in a monarchy; and is generally more odious and intolerable, under the two former than under the latter; as is glaringly evident at this time in France, and probably in other *nominal* republicks of Europe.*

Hiero, from whom this dialogue takes its name, was king or tyrant of Syracuse, the capital of Sicily, one of the most flourishing republicks, and most beautiful and magnificent cities

* Tully has well explained this. See Appendix, No. I.
of

of Greece.^d They had conferred the sovereign power on Gelon, the elder brother of Hiero, after his victory over the Carthaginians, which rescued them from the yoke of that tyrannical and sanguinary republick. Historians are divided about the real character of Hiero; though their different opinions may easily, I think, be reconciled.^e

On his first accession to the throne, he was avaricious, haughty, vindictive, and cruel. And having not sufficient confidence in the affection of his subjects, he found it necessary to keep in pay some mercenary troops, as guards of his person, which made

^d Appendix, No. II.

^e Appendix, No. III.

him still more unpopular. But a tedious illness having given him time for reflection, to amuse himself in his confinement, he invited and detained at his court, by the most *liberal* treatment in every sense of the word, men distinguished for their wisdom and ingenuity from every part of Greece; and, by conversing frequently and freely with them, from a cruel and haughty tyrant, became modest, humble, and humane; regained the love of his subjects, and passed the remainder of his life respected and esteemed.

Amongst the learned men who resided at his court, the most in his confidence was Simonides, the other speaker in this dialogue; not only an
excellent

excellent poet, (as appears by some fragments of his works still extant^f) but a philosopher of great wisdom and virtue, and of a character so respectable, that he is said to have prevented a war between Hiero and Theron king of Agrigentum, and reconciled them by his interposition.

This conversation, in the former part, contains the parallel which Hiero draws between the condition of kings and that of private persons; and in the latter, the precepts which Simonides gives for the conduct of kings in general. The wisdom and ingenuity of this poet, joined to his great age, give him sufficient authority to take upon

^f See Appendix, No. IV.

him

him this latter article; and no one could be more proper to sustain the former character, than a prince who had lived so long as a private man, and was now raised to the sovereignty of so powerful a commonwealth; and consequently knew by experience the real difference, in regard to happiness or misery, between a private station and the condition of royalty.

In short, as *envy* or disappointed ambition has probably influenced many of those in the higher ranks in France, who have shewn such inveteracy against the royal family; and those also in this country, who vent the same disloyal sentiments; a proper attention to this subject, one would hope, might
mitigate

mitigate their rancour against those, who, in the estimation of philosophy, must be deemed the least *enviable* of all mankind.*

“ Pol me miserum, patrone, vocares, ”

“ Si velles, inquit, verum mihi ponere nomen.”

HOR. lib. i. ep. 7.

In every rank of life indeed, to make us contented in our respective stations, the superior is usually much less to be envied, than his inferior or dependant. Some degree of power may, on many accounts, be desirable, but one would not think it possible to envy a prime-

* A king of England indeed must be excepted from this remark, who has it in his power, not only to be happy, but (as we at present experience) to make his people happy, and to be universally loved and esteemed by all parties.

minister

minister his "painful pre-eminence." The labourer retires to his cottage, and sleeps soundly; while the wealthy yeoman, who pays him his wages, lies restless with care, half the night, how to dispose of his money on good securities and to the best advantage. The valet dresses his lord, and the abigail her lady, and their work is done. They fall forth to their tea-garden, or to their "high-life below stairs," strangers to the mortification and chagrin which the ambition of his lordship, perhaps, or the vanity of his lady, may be destined to undergo, in their pursuits of power, pleasure, or precedence.

But an Eastern monarch, who had enjoyed all the splendor and all the
luxury

luxury attendant on royalty, and who was esteemed *tolerably* wise in his day, has assured us, "that the heart alone
" knoweth its own bitterness, and a
" stranger doth not intermeddle with
" its joy;" that is, No one can judge from external appearance, of the happiness or misery, the secret griefs or concealed raptures, in the breast of a stranger.



H I E R O:

ON THE

CONDITION OF ROYALTY.

A CONVERSATION BETWEEN HIERO
AND SIMONIDES.

CHAP. I.

THE poet Simonides, being come to reside at the court of Hiero king of Syracuse, one day as they were conversing at their leisure, "Will you, Hiero," said Simonides, "inform me of some particulars, which, it is reasonable to suppose, you must know much better than I can do?"

'What

‘ What particulars then do you imagine,’ said Hiero, ‘ I can possibly know better than so learned and wise a man as you are generally acknowledged to be?’

“ Why,” replied Simonides, “ I have known you, when you were yet a *private* man, and now see you advanced to *royalty*. It is probable, therefore, that you, who have experienced both these states, should know, better than I can do, wherein the life of a king differs from that of a private man, in regard to the pleasures or inconveniences attendant on each state.”

‘ Well then,’ said Hiero, ‘ but as you are now in a private station, ought
not

not you first to recall to my remembrance the pleasures and inconveniences of a private life? By which means, I shall be better enabled to shew you the difference of the two states in question.'

To this Simonides thus replied: " I think then, Hiero, I have observed, that men in private life possess all the genuine feelings of nature. They receive pleasure and pain from the proper objects of their several senses; from visible objects by their eyes; of sounds by their ears; of scents by their nostrils; of food by the palate; and other sensual enjoyments, the source of which every one knows.

" It

“ It appears to me likewise, added he, that we receive agreeable or painful sensations from heat and cold, from things hard and soft, heavy and light, in the whole and in every part of the body. But to perceive pleasure or pain from what is good or evil (*in a moral sense*) belongs, I think, to the mind alone: yet in some sense, to the mind and body in conjunction.*

“ I find by experience also, that we receive pleasure from sleep; but, from what source, and from what kind of sleep, and when this pleasure arises, I own myself at a loss to explain. Neither is this at all surprising, as we

* The meaning here is not very obvious.

certainly

certainly have less distinct perceptions when asleep, than when we are awake."

✓ To this Hiero answered: "I confess, Simonides, I know not any sensations of pleasure or pain that a king can receive, besides those which you have mentioned. And consequently I do not see, hitherto, in what the life of a king differs from that of a private person."

"Yet even in these particulars," answered Simonides, "there is a very material difference. And, in each of these, kings experience infinitely more pleasure and less pain than private persons."

c

'Ah!'

‘ Ah!’ cried Hiero, ‘ this is by no means the case: but be assured, that in all these respects, kings taste much less pleasure, and feel much more chagrin, than those individuals who are placed in the middle ranks of life.’

“ What you say,” replied Simonides, “ is altogether incredible. For, if it were so, why should such numbers, and those who are esteemed for their sense and wisdom, be so ambitious of royalty? And, why do all mankind envy kings?”

‘ Because,’ said Hiero, they form their opinions without having experienced both these conditions of life.

But

But I will endeavour to convince you of the truth of what I assert, and will proceed in the same order which you have suggested, and begin with the pleasures of *fight*: for it was thence, I think, that you commenced this discourse.'

CHAP. II.

' IN the first place then, if we reason from the objects of fight, I am convinced that kings have the least share of pleasure in that respect.

' Every country has its curiosities, which deserve to be visited and viewed by strangers. Now men in private stations can come or go to any part of

the world without ceremony; and into whatever cities they please, for the sake of the public spectacles; and into those general assemblies* of all Greece, where are collected together, whatever is thought worthy of the attention and curiosity of mankind.

‘ As for kings,† they can rarely amuse themselves with spectacles of any kind. For neither would it be safe for them to go, where they would not be superior to any force which could be exerted against them; nor are their affairs usually so firmly established at home, that they could fe-

* The Olympic games. See the Appendix.

† The word *kings* must here mean *tyrants*.

curely

curely trust the administration of them to others, and go out of their kingdoms. They could not do it without the danger of being deprived of their sovereignty; and, at the same time, of being unable to avenge themselves on those who had injured them.

‘ Yet you will tell me, perhaps, that spectacles of this kind may be presented to kings, though they remain at home. But I assure you, Simonides, this is the case only with regard to a very few; and even for those, such as they are, kings must generally pay extremely dear. As they who have obliged a king with any trifling exhibition of this kind, expect to be dismissed at once with a greater reward than they could

hope for from any other man after a whole life's attendance.*

CHAP. III.

“ WELL then,” said Simonides, “ granting that you are in a worse condition, with regard to the objects of *fight*, yet you have greatly the advantage from the sense of *bearing*; as you are incessantly entertained with the most delightful of all musick, that of your own praises. For all those

* It is probably a common remark, which I often heard from a man of rank and large fortune, that he could not afford to receive *presents*.

who

who approach you, applaud every thing you say and every thing you do. And, on the contrary, you are never exposed to what is most painful, the hearing yourself censured or reproached. For no one will venture to rebuke a king to his face."

' Alas!' answered Hiero, ' what pleasure do you imagine a king can receive from those who do not *speake* ill of him, when he is convinced that, although they are silent, they *think* every thing that is bad of him? Or what delight can they afford, who applaud him when he has so much reason to suspect their praises of adulation?'

" Why

“Why really,” replied Simonides, “I must so far entirely agree with you, that those praises must be most agreeable, which are bestowed on us by men who are entirely free and independent.”*

CHAP. IV.

“HOWEVER,” added Simonides, “with regard to the sense of *taste*, you surely cannot convince any one but that you enjoy the pleasures of the table more than the rest of mankind.”

* Xenophon says of Agesilaus, “That he was much pleased with the *praises* of those who would have *blamed* him with equal freedom, if he had acted improperly,” AGESIL. ch. ii. §. 5.

‘I know,’

‘ I know,’ said Hiero, ‘ that most men imagine we must necessarily receive more pleasure in eating and drinking; because they would do the same, from the variety with which our tables are served, than from what they usually meet with at their own. For whatever is rare, and excels what we are accustomed to, affords a greater pleasure. For which reason all men expect with joy the approach of a feast, except kings; for *their* tables being constantly provided to the full can have no sort of addition on any festival occasions. In this respect then, in the first place, by being deprived of *hope*, kings are less happy than private men.

‘ I make

‘ I make no doubt, likewise, but you yourself have experienced that the more superfluous dishes are set before us, the sooner we are cloyed with eating. So that, with regard to the *duration* of this pleasure, he who is served with such profusion is in a much worse condition than one who lives in a more frugal and less plentiful stile.’

“ But after all,” replied Simonides, “ as long as the appetite for food continues, those must certainly find more pleasure who feed at a sumptuous table, than those who are confined to cheap and ordinary provisions.”

‘ Do

‘ Do not you imagine then, Simonides,’ said Hiero, ‘ that in proportion to the delight which any one takes in any thing, the more fondly he is usually attached to it.’

“ Undoubtedly,” says Simonides.

‘ Have you then ever remarked, that kings approach with greater delight to the food which is prepared for them, than private persons do to their frugal viands?’

“ No, really;” answered Simonides, “ the very reverse seems to me to be the truth of the case.”

‘ For

‘ For have you not observed,’ says Hiero, ‘ those many artificial preparations and variety of fauces, of a sharp and poignant relish, to stimulate the appetite, which are served up at the table of kings?’

“ I certainly have,” replied Simonides, “ and am convinced these high fauces are quite unnatural and inimical to the health of man.”

‘ Do you think then,’ said Hiero, ‘ that these unnatural delicacies can afford pleasure to any one, but to those whose palates are vitiated by luxury and indulgence? For my part I know by experience (and you cannot be ignorant)

norant) that those who have a good appetite want no artificial preparations of this kind.

CHAP. V.

“ THEN as to those expensive perfumes which you make use of,” said Simonides, “ I really believe that those who approach your persons have more enjoyment of them than you yourselves have. As in respect to those who have eaten any thing of a disagreeable odour, the person himself is not so much incommoded by it, as those who come too near him.”

‘ That

‘That is precisely the case,’ replied Hiero, ‘with those who have constantly a variety of food set before them. They eat nothing with an appetite; whereas he who but rarely meets with any delicacy, feeds upon it with a true relish, whenever it makes its appearance.’

CHAP. VI.

“BUT, after all,” says Simonides, “perhaps the greatest incitement to your aspiring after royalty are the pleasures of love. For in this respect it is in your power to enjoy every object, the most beautiful in its kind.”

‘Alas!’

‘Alas!’ cries Hiero, ‘you have now produced an instance, in which you must certainly know we are far less happy than private persons. For, in the first place, those marriages are generally esteemed most honourable, and to confer the greatest dignity, as well as pleasure, which we contract with our superiors in rank and fortune: and in the second place, are those of equals with their equals: but to form an alliance of that kind with an inferior, is disgraceful and injurious to our character. Unless a king marries a stranger, therefore, he must necessarily marry an inferior; so that he can never enjoy what is most agreeable in the married state.

‘The

‘ The attention and respect also which is paid us by a woman of birth and spirit gives a man great pleasure; but, when paid us by a slave, it affords us very little satisfaction. Yet if they fail of that respect which is our due, we are provoked and chagrined.

‘ In short, with regard to the mere sensual pleasures of love, where marriage is out of the question, kings have still less of that pleasure to boast of: for we all know, that it is love alone which renders fruition so exquisitely delightful; but love is more rarely excited in the breast of kings than of any other men. For we despise easy and obvious pleasures, but the passion is nourished by hope. And

as

as a person who is not thirsty never drinks with pleasure, so he who is not stimulated by love knows not the true pleasure of enjoyment.'

Hiero having thus spoken, Simonides, with a smile, replied: "What is this which you assert, O Hiero! that love cannot be excited in the breast of kings? Whence comes it to pass then, that you are so fond of Dai-locha, the most beautiful of her sex?"

'Why truly, my Simonides,' said he, 'it is not for what I could with so much ease obtain of her, but for what it is least of all in the power of kings to effect.

D

'I own

‘ I own I love Dailocha for what we naturally desire to obtain from a beautiful object. Those favours, however, which I so earnestly wish to receive *voluntarily*, and with mutual affection, I could no more endure to extort by force, than I could to do violence to my own person.

‘ To plunder and take by force from an enemy, we consider as a real cause of exultation: but no favours from a beloved object can give us any joy, except those which are voluntarily bestowed. From such an object, who returns our passion, every thing is agreeable: her slightest regards; her trifling questions; her childish answers; and the most agreeable

able of all, perhaps, and the most alluring, are her struggles and counterfeited resentments. But, to possess by force a woman whom we love is, in my opinion, to act more like a robber than a lover. A robber indeed receives some gratification from the idea of gain, and perhaps from having done an injury to an adversary; but to take a pleasure in giving pain to a person whom we love, and to treat one for whom we profess a regard, as if we really hated them; and to torment a woman, to whom our caresses are odious and disgusting, is surely most detestable and inhuman.

‘ In short, if a private person receives favours from a woman whom

he loves, it is an unequivocal pledge of her affection; as he knows she is under no necessity to comply with his solicitations.

‘ But a king has no right to imagine that he is ever sincerely beloved.* For we know, that those who submit to our pleasure through fear, counterfeit as much as is in their power the air and manner of those whose compliance is the effect of a sincere affection. Yet, never are conspiracies against kings so frequently conducted as by those who affect to love them with the greatest sincerity.’

* Un roy, qui peut s’assurer de cent mille bras, ne peut guères s’assurer d’un cœur.

Fontenelle Dialog. des Morts.

CHAP. VII.

TO all this Simonides replied:
“ Well, my good Hiero, in regard to what you have hitherto alleged, I confess they are but trifles; for I see many men of respectable characters, who voluntarily refrain from the pleasures of the table, and are indifferent to what they eat or drink, and also entirely abstain from all intercourse with the fair sex.

“ But in another respect there is certainly a striking superiority of kings over private men; that you conceive and readily execute great projects; that you have a greater abundance of whatever is excellent in its kind; you

D 3

possess

possess the finest and most spirited horses; the most beautiful arms; the richest ornaments for your women; the most magnificent palaces, and those adorned with the most sumptuous furniture; you are attended with a greater number of domesticks, and those of the most expert and dexterous that can be found. Add to this, that you have the most ample means of avenging yourselves on your enemies, and of rewarding your friends."

' Alas! my Simonides,' said Hiero,
' that the multitude are dazzled with
the splendor of royalty I am not at
all surpris'd; for the vulgar in gene-
ral

ral seem to me to judge of happiness and misery merely by appearances. Now, as royalty displays to the eyes of the world those possessions which are commonly esteemed the most valuable, so it conceals the evils to which kings are exposed in the inmost recesses of their soul, where alone real happiness or misery reside.

‘ That these things, therefore, should escape the notice of the multitude, I am not at all surpris’d, as I said; but, that you should be under the same mistake, who form your judgment from reflection more than from external appearances, I own, excites my astonishment. For my part, Simonides, I assure you, from my own
experience,

experience, that kings have the least share of the greatest goods, and much the largest portion of the greatest evils, incident to human life.

‘ For instance, if peace is esteemed in the opinion of mankind the greatest good, it is certain, the smallest portion of that good is allotted to kings: and likewise, if war is the greatest evil, the greatest part of that evil is the portion of kings.

‘ In the first place then, unless the whole country be engaged in a civil war, private individuals may securely go where they please, without danger to their persons. Whereas kings* find

* The reader must here advert to what is observed in the Preface, that in the Attick writers, the word “tyrant” has

it always necessary to march as through an enemy's country; armed themselves, and attended by guards completely armed.

Moreover, private persons, if they go to make war in an enemy's country, as soon as they return home find themselves again in perfect security; but kings, (I mean arbitrary despots) when they return to their own capitals, find themselves in the midst of the greatest number of enemies. And if a more

has three distinct senses. Sometimes,—1st, a lawful king, appointed by the constitution of any country: 2dly, one who usurps the sovereign power in a free state, whether he exercise it with moderation, or with cruelty and injustice: 3dly, a despot, or absolute monarch, who rules by force. In the sequel of this discourse it is generally used in the last sense.

powerful

powerful enemy make war upon any city, those who are attacked may be in danger so long as they are without the walls; but as soon as they have retreated within their intrenchments, they find themselves in perfect security: whereas a tyrant, far from finding himself safe, even within his own palace, has then the greatest cause to be upon his guard.

‘ Again, when by negociation peace is restored, private persons find themselves freed from the inconveniences of war; but tyrants never really are at peace with those whom they hold in subjection; nor dares a tyrant rely upon the faith of any treaty which he makes with the rest of mankind.

‘ In

‘ In short, there are wars indeed which free states are obliged to carry on with each other, as there are those which kings are forced to wage with those whom they have deprived of their liberty: but whatever inconveniences these states may experience from such wars, the same occur in those which kings are obliged to maintain.

‘ Both the one and the other are under a necessity of being always armed, and continually upon their guard, and of exposing themselves to great dangers: and if they chance to lose a battle, or meet with any disaster, they are both thrown into equal consternation.

‘ And

‘ And thus far wars are nearly upon the same footing, both with kings and free states. But then the agreeable circumstances which those experience from victory, who serve under a free state, to these tyrants are entirely strangers. For when the individuals of a free city gain the advantage over their adversaries in a battle, it is not easy to express the pleasure which they feel to see their enemies put to flight; their alacrity in the pursuit, and their delight even in the havock which they make of their foes: How much they glory in such an exploit; how splendid their triumph; and how much they exult in the idea of having augmented the strength of the commonwealth;

wealth;* every individual gives himself the credit of having had a part in planning the expedition, and of contributing to its success. Nay, you will hardly find a man who does not magnify his own prowess, and pretend to have slain more with his own hand, than perhaps were left dead on the field of battle. So glorious to every individual does the victory appear, which was obtained by a free state.†

* Xenophon seems to speak with the feelings of a foldier and a patriotick statesman.

† We might add here what Rousseau observes, "How many sovereigns have been made unhappy by the loss of countries which they had never seen!"

‘ As

‘ As for a king, or tyrant, when he suspects and is actually convinced that his subjects are forming dangerous designs against him, if he puts some of them to death, he is certain that he shall not by that means bring over the whole city to his interest; and is sensible at the same time, that he is diminishing the number of his subjects; of course he can neither rejoice (much less can he pride himself) on such an achievement. Nay, he extenuates, as far as is in his power, and makes an apology for what he has done, as having been void of any ill intention.

‘ And even after the death of those who were the chief objects of his fear, he is so far from being freed from
from

from his apprehensions, that he finds it necessary to be still more upon his guard than he was before. And thus does a tyrant live in a continual state of war; as, from experience, I can testify.

CHAP. VIII.

‘OBSERVE, in the next place, what kind of friendships kings are capable of enjoying: but let us first consider how great a blessing friendship is to mankind. For when a man is sincerely beloved, his friends are always happy in his presence, and delight in serving and doing him good.

When

When he is absent, they anxiously wish for his return; and when he does return, receive him with transports of joy: they rejoice with him in his good fortune, and are eager to assist him in his adversity.

‘Neither has it escaped the attention of several states, that friendship is the greatest and most valuable good that mortals can enjoy. For under many governments, the laws permit adulterers alone to be slain with impunity. And for this reason; that they suppose them to alienate that affection and friendship which a woman ought to have for her husband. For if a woman, by any *extraordinary concurrence* of circumstances, should be
guilty

guilty of an act of infidelity, the husband may not perhaps esteem her the less, if he is convinced that her friendship for him continues inviolate and undiminished.*

‘ For my part, I esteem it so great an happiness to be beloved by our friends, that we can hardly have any thing further to wish for from gods or men. But of this happiness, I am convinced, no one enjoys less than tyrants or kings. That what I assert is true, Simonides, attend to the following particulars.

* Comfortable doctrine. If a china dish *happens* to slip out of a poor girl’s *band*, and is broken, who can blame her?

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‘ The

‘ The firmest friendships then seem to be those which reciprocally subsist between parents and their children; between brothers and brothers; between husbands and their wives; and lastly, those which a daily intercourse produces between companions and acquaintance.

‘ Now, if you consider the affair attentively, Simonides, you will find that private persons enjoy the greatest share of this affection; but amongst kings or tyrants, how many do you find who have put to death their own children; or, on the contrary, have perished by their own offspring! How many brothers who have slain each other to arrive at the sovereign power! How many

many tyrants, possessed of that power, have been murdered by their wives, and by their associates who have professed the greatest friendship for them? If, therefore, those who were prompted by natural affection, or obliged by the laws, to shew a regard to kings, have nevertheless expressed their detestation of them; how is it probable, do you think, that any others should entertain any friendship for them?

CHAP. IX.

‘ AGAIN; as mutual confidence among mankind is a very great blessing, is not he who has the least share

of this confidence deprived of a very great blessing? For, with what pleasure can men converse familiarly together without mutual confidence? What happiness can exist between the sexes in marriage, if this confidence is banished? or, how can we bear even a domestick in our family, if we have not an opinion of his fidelity?

‘ Of this happiness then, I mean, of relying with confidence on those about us, no one partakes less than a tyrant: since he lives in a continual state of suspicion, even when the most delicious food, or the most exquisite liquors, are set before him. Infomuch that, before he makes any offering or libation to the gods, he obliges some domestick

domestick first to taste it, lest even in those sacred viands something poisonous should be concealed.

CHAP. X.

‘MOREOVER, to every other mortal, their country is held dear, and the chief object of their affection: and the citizens of the same state protect each other, without stipend, against their slaves, and against other base assassins, that no one may be exposed to any violent death. And this precaution has been carried so far, that many laws have been enacted, declaring

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claring those polluted who should associate or converse with an homicide. Thus every private citizen lives in security under the protection procured him by his country; but even in this respect the very reverse is the case with tyrants. For, so far from punishing those who put a tyrant to death, they usually reward them with distinguished honours. And, instead of excluding them from the religious rites, as they do those who have murdered a private citizen, they generally erect statues to them in the temples of the gods.

‘ But should you imagine, that a king is more happy, from possessing more wealth, than a private individual,
in

in this, my Simonides, you are extremely mistaken. For as an athlete never prides himself on vanquishing one who is ignorant of the gymnastick exercises, but is sensibly mortified if he is overcome by his antagonist; thus a king takes no pleasure in having larger possessions than a private subject; but he is greatly chagrined to see other kings more opulent than himself: for these only he considers as his antagonists, or rivals, with regard to riches.

CHAP. XI.

‘ NEITHER can a king, in general, gratify his wishes more readily than

than a private man. For the object of a private man's utmost ambition is, perhaps, no more than a house, a field, or a slave; but a king usually aims at the acquisition of cities, of extensive provinces, harbours, or fortified citadels; which are obtained with much more difficulty and danger than those objects which excite the wishes of private individuals.

‘Nay, you will find but few that are really poor amongst private persons, in comparison with those who may be called so amongst sovereigns: For an abundance, or a sufficiency,* is not to be estimated by the number of

* See this subject elegantly treated by our author, at the beginning of his *CEconomicks*.

our possessions, but by the exigences of our station: and, according to this idea, whatever exceeds a sufficiency, may be called *too much*, and what falls short of it, *too little*. Now, much more ample revenues may not be sufficient for the necessary expences of a king, than what would suffice a private person. As for private persons, they are at liberty to contract their daily expences, as they find it convenient; but kings have not the same privilege: for, as their greatest and most necessary expences are employed for the maintenance of those who guard their persons, to retrench these expences, seems to threaten their immediate destruction.

‘ Then,

‘ Then, how can we consider those as poor, and the objects of compassion, who can obtain, by lawful means, whatever they stand in need of? But those who are under a necessity of being guilty of unjust and dishonourable actions, how can we but esteem them really poor and miserable beings? But tyrants are often forced to pillage the temples of the gods, and plunder men, through mere want of their necessary supplies: for, when engaged in war, they must either keep on foot a sufficient force, or inevitably perish by their adversaries.

CHAP. XII.

‘BUT, give me leave, my Simonides, to mention another difficulty to which kings are exposed. They are equally capable, with private persons, of distinguishing the merit of accomplished, of wise, and of virtuous men. But, instead of viewing them with pleasure and admiration, they behold them with fear. They dread men of courage, lest they should make some bold attempt in favour of liberty. They dread men of great parts, lest they should engage in some dangerous plot; and virtuous men, lest the multitude should wish to raise them to the sovereign power.

‘Now

‘ Now when, from suspicion, they have secretly freed themselves from men of this respectable character, whom have they left to employ in their service, but dishonest, or debauched, or slavish wretches? They trust these dishonest miscreants, because men of that character must fear, as much as the tyrant himself, that if a city become free, they will meet with their deserts: the debauched, because from their luxury and sloth they will be attached to the present power: slaves, because being accustomed to the yoke, they will not wish to be free. This then, in my opinion, is a most mortifying reflection; to behold with approbation men of virtue, and to be under

under a necessity of employing men of a character entirely the reverse.

CHAP. XIII.

‘IT is likewise necessary for a tyrant to shew a love and regard for the city under his dominion: for he cannot be happy, nor even safe, independently of the affection of the citizens. And yet the necessity he is under to support his authority, obliges him, in some measure, to treat them with severity. For tyrants do not wish to render their subjects brave, or to see them well-armed; but they love to raise the power of a foreign force over their countrymen,

countrymen, and to use them as the guards of their person.

‘ Neither do they rejoice with their fellow-citizens, when a fruitful year of *corn* produces every thing in abundance. For the more indigent the people are, the more humble and more submissive they expect to find them.

CHAP. XIV.

‘ BUT I will now lay before you, my Simonides,’ added Hiero, ‘ a true account of those pleasures which I enjoyed, when I was a private man, and which I find myself deprived of since I became a king. I then con-
versed

versed familiarly with my equals; delighted with their company, as they were with mine: and I conversed also with myself, whenever I chose to indulge in the calm of solitude.

‘ I frequently spent my time in convivial entertainments, and drinking with my friends, so as to forget the chagrins to which human life is obnoxious; nay, often to a degree of extravagance; to singing, dancing, and every degree of festivity, unrestrained but by our own inclinations. But I am now debarred from the society of those who could afford me any delight, as I have slaves alone for my companions, instead of friends: nor can I converse agreeably with men in whom

I cannot

I cannot discover the least benevolence or attachment to me; and I am forced to guard against intoxication or sleep, as a most *dangerous* snare.

‘ But now, to be continually alarmed, either in a crowd, or in solitude: to be in fear when without guards, and to be afraid of the guards themselves: to be unwilling to have them about me without their arms, and to be under apprehensions to see them armed; what a wretched state of existence is this!

‘ Moreover, to place a greater confidence in strangers than in one’s own countrymen; in barbarians, than in Greeks; to be under a necessity of treating freemen like slaves, and to
give

give slaves their freedom; are not all these things evident symptoms of a mind disturbed and quite deranged by fear? Now this passion of fear not only creates uneasiness, and diffuses a constant gloom over the mind, but, being mixed with all our pleasures, deprives us of all kind of enjoyment.

‘ But, if you have had any experience of military affairs, Simonides, and have ever been posted near a body of the enemy; only recollect, how little you were disposed either to eat or to sleep in that situation. Such as were your uneasy sensations on that occasion; such, or rather more dreadful, are those to which tyrants are continually exposed: for their imagina-

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tion

tion not only represents their enemies as encamped in their fight, but as furrounding them on every side.'

To this Simonides answered, "Your observation is extremely just. War is undoubtedly subject to continual alarms. Nevertheless, even during a campaign, when we have previously disposed our sentinels, we eat and sleep in the utmost security."

'That is very true,' said Hiero, 'for the laws watch over the guards themselves; so that they are as much in fear on their own account as on yours. But kings have only mercenaries for their guards, whom they
pay

pay as they do their labourers in *the harvest*. And though the principal duty of guards is to be faithful to their trust, yet it is more difficult to find one of that description faithful, than the generality of workmen in any branch of business; especially, when these guards enlist themselves for the sake of the stipend, and have it in their power, in a short time, to gain a much larger sum, by assassinating a tyrant, than they would receive from the tyrant by many years faithful attendance.

CHAP. XV.

‘AS for what you observed,’ continued Hiero, ‘that kings were to be envied for the power which they enjoy, of serving their friends, and of subduing their enemies; neither is this by any means true. As for our friends, how can you suppose that we should be very desirous to serve them; when we are convinced, that he who is under the greatest obligation to us, will be the first to withdraw himself from our sight, and to avoid any further intercourse with us: for no one considers what he has received from a tyrant as his property, ’till he is escaped from his power.

‘Then,

‘ Then, as for his enemies, how can you say, that tyrants can so readily subdue them, when they are sensible that every one is their enemy who is subject to their power. They cannot put them all to death, nor confine them all in prison. For over whom could they, in that case, exercise their dominion? But, although he knows them all to be his enemies, he is under a necessity at the same time, both to guard himself against them, and yet to make use of their service.

‘ Be assured of this then, my Simonides, that with regard to their fellow-citizens whom they thus fear, it is equally painful to tyrants to see them alive, and to put them to death. It is

with them as with a spirited horse, which we are afraid to mount, yet are unwilling to put him to death on account of his good qualities, though we dare not make use of him for fear of some fatal accident.

‘The same is applicable to other possessions, which are useful, and yet attended with some inconvenience; though we possess them with anxiety, we cannot lose them without pain and vexation.’

CHAP. XVI.

SIMONIDES having listened to Hiero, replied: “Well then, Hiero; but honour and respect appear to me to be

be objects of so much importance, that men submit to every kind of toil and danger to obtain them. And you yourself, it should seem, notwithstanding the many inconveniences which you say attend on royalty, yet are thus strongly attached to it, that you may be honoured and respected; that all your orders may be implicitly obeyed; that all men may have their eyes upon you; may rise from their seats, or give you the way on your approach; in short, that all who are about you, may testify their respect by their words and their actions: for it is by these, and every other instance of deference, that subjects continually shew their respect to their kings.

“ For

“For my part, Hiero, I confess that I think this desire of esteem and honour is the distinguishing characteristick of man from other animals: for it appears probable, that the pleasure arising from eating, drinking, sleeping, and other natural functions, are common to all animals. But the love of honour is not discoverable in brutes, nor in all men: insomuch, that those in whom the love of honour or glory is most conspicuous, are usually the furthest removed from mere brutes; and are commonly named *men*,* in its most noble sense, by way of eminence. So that it is not with-

* The Greek has two words to express this; *ἀνδρες*, and *ἄνθρωποι*,

out reason, in my opinion, that you submit to all these inconveniences which attend on royalty, when you are so much more honoured and respected than other men. For, of all the pleasures which mankind can enjoy, no one seems to approach nearer to divine than that which they receive from being honoured and respected."

To this Hiero replied: ' But, I assure you, my Simonides, that the honours which are paid to kings are extremely similar to the pleasures which, I have already shewn you, they receive from love.* For neither are those compliances which are shewn us by them

* See chap. vi.

who

who are void of a reciprocal affection, to be esteemed as favours; nor can those which are extorted by force, give us any pleasure. In like manner, we ought not to consider as marks of respect, those honours which are paid us by such as fear us.† For how can we suppose, that they who rise from their seats to those who have injured them, or that give the way to those who tyrannise over them, can possibly entertain any real honour or regard for them. We, every day, make presents to those whom we hate; and this at the very time when we are most apprehensive of suffering from their power; but these things ought cer-

† See the Appendix.

tainly

tainly to be considered as acts of fervility: whereas real respect must proceed from quite contrary causes. For when we think a man is capable to do us service, and we really enjoy the effects of his good-will, we then celebrate his praises with pleasure; every one considers him as his benefactor; pays him the utmost deference; rises from his seat on his approach, not from fear, but love; they present him with *crowns** and other donations, as a tribute to his virtue and publick spirit. In this case, in my opinion,

* This is to be taken in its literal sense, as it was a custom amongst the Athenians to present a *crown* to any citizen who had signalized himself on any particular occasion. This gave rise to Demosthenes's well-known Oration, "*de Corona*."

both

both those who bestow these marks of respect on such a man confer substantial honour, and he who is thought worthy of them is truly and effectually honoured; and I cannot but pronounce him an happy man who is thus honoured and respected. For, instead of forming conspiracies against such a man, I observe, that every one is solicitous to prevent his suffering any injury; so that he spends his life happily, free from fears, from envy, and from danger: a tyrant, on the contrary, assure yourself, Simonides, passes every day and night as if all mankind had already condemned him to death for his injustice.'

CHAP. XVII.

HAVING heard all these particulars, "Whence comes it to pass then," cries Simonides, "if the condition of royalty is so wretched, and you are convinced that it is so, that you, Hiero, do not free yourself from so great an evil? Yet neither you, nor any one else, who was in possession of royalty, ever voluntarily resigned it."

'It is for that very reason, my Simonides,' replied he, 'that the condition of a king is the most wretched state imaginable: for there is really no possibility of resigning it with safety. Indeed, how can a tyrant find
sufficient

sufficient resources, either to restore that wealth which he has extorted from his subjects; or to recompense those whom he has suffered to languish in prison? or how can he restore life to those whom he has put to death?

‘ In short, my Simonides, if ever any man could be a gainer by *hanging** himself, a tyrant would be so: for he alone is in a situation to which he can hardly submit, nor yet gain any thing by quitting it.’

CHAP. XVIII.

SIMONIDES, resuming the discourse, thus replied: “ Now then, O

* *Απαιξασθαι*: literally so.

Hiero!

Hiero! I am no longer surpris'd, that *you* speak so disadvantageously of the condition of royalty: since, ambitious as you are to gain the friendship of mankind, you find it an invincible obstacle to your wishes. I think, however, I can convince you, that sovereign power is so far from preventing one who is possess'd of it from being beloved, that it gives him a great advantage in that respect over a private individual.

“ In considering this subject, however, I will not insist, that, because a king has more power, he therefore can bestow greater favours upon his friends: but, suppose a private person and a king do the same thing, let us enquire

enquire which confers the greatest obligation.—To begin with matters of the least importance.

“ Suppose a king and a private person to address any one whom they chance to see in an obliging and affectionate manner; to which of the two will such a one listen with the greatest satisfaction? Or, let them proceed to praise or compliment him; whose praises, do you imagine, would affect him the most sensibly? Or, let each of them invite him to an entertainment after the sacrifice;* to which of

* Among the Greeks, they usually invited their friends, after the sacrifice, to partake of what remained of the victims; that is, the best and greatest part, says Mons. COSTE.

the two do you think he would esteem himself the most obliged for that honour? Let both of them pay him the same attention when he is sick; is it not evident likewise, that the kind offices of those who have the most power, give him the most sensible pleasure? Lastly, let each of them make him equal presents; is it not visible also, that favours of half the value from a great man have more weight, and impress him with a deeper sense of gratitude, than those of double the value from a private person?

“Nay, there appears to me a certain dignity and grace which the gods have attached to the very person of a king; which not only adds a lustre to
G his

his appearance, but makes us really behold the same man with more pleasure, when vested with authority, than when in a private station: and, in general, we certainly take a pride and are more delighted to converse with our superiors than with our equals.*

“ As for the favours of the fair sex, which supplied you with the principal complaint against the condition of royalty, they are the least disgusted with the old age of a prince, and the reputation of those with whom he has an amour do not suffer any diminution. For the honour which he does them,

* This sentiment will not be relished in this enlightened age; but, perhaps, the philosopher intended it as a delicate compliment to Hiero, who had been a private man.

adds

adds a lustre to their character: so that what is ignominious in such a connexion seems to disappear, and what is honourable appears with more splendor.

“ Then, as by equal services you confer greater obligations, why ought not you to be more beloved than private persons, since you have it in your power to be much more useful to mankind, and to bestow more liberal donations than any private individual can possibly do?”

‘ It is,’ replied Hiero, ‘ with some vivacity, because, my Simonides, we are under a necessity of doing more invidious and unpopular acts than

G 2

private

private persons usually do. We must raise money by imposing taxes, if we would have sufficient for our ordinary expences: we must have persons to guard what is necessary to be guarded: we must punish crimes, and restrain the injurious and petulant; and when any occasion requires expedition, and an attack is to be made, either by sea or land, we are responsible for the success, and must take care not to give the charge either to negligent or cowardly commanders.

‘ Moreover, a king is obliged to have mercenary troops, and nothing is more odious or insupportable to a free city, than the burthen of such an expence: for they naturally suppose, that these
troops

troops are kept in pay, not merely for state, but to enable him to tyrannise over his subjects.'

CHAP. XIX.

TO this Simonides again replied:
"I do not deny, O Hiero! that all these affairs must be carefully managed. But, amidst this variety of concerns, as there are some which render those who have the charge of them extremely odious, there are others which have a contrary effect.

"Thus to instruct mankind in things the most excellent, and to honour and applaud those learned men

G 3

who

who perform this service with industry and care, is a duty, the performance of which must procure the love of all good men. On the contrary, to be forced to rebuke and treat with severity, to fine and chastise those who do ill, these things must certainly render a king odious and unpopular.

“ I should think it adviseable, therefore, for a prince, when the occasion requires it, to employ others to inflict punishments, and to reserve to himself the distribution of rewards. And that this conduct is attended with good effects, experience testifies.

“ Thus, for instance, at our publick solemnities, when the different choirs contend for victory, he that presides

presides over the contest, distributes the prizes, but leaves to the magistrate the care of collecting the bands, and to others, that of instructing them, and of correcting those who are defective in the performance. By this means the agreeable part is executed by the president, and whatever is of a contrary kind is committed to others. What forbids, therefore, to manage other political affairs in the same manner? For all cities are usually divided, some into tribes, others into classes, and others into centuries and the like; and each of these divisions has its proper chief, who presides over them.

“ If,

“ If, therefore, we were to propose rewards to these different bodies, (as we do in the musical contests to the different choirs) to those who were the best armed, or who kept their ranks best, or shewed most skill in horsemanship, or most courage in an engagement, or most justice in their civil transactions, it is reasonable to suppose, that, through emulation, all these several duties would be more strenuously performed; and, animated by the love of glory, they would be more ready to march whenever the service required, and would more cheerfully contribute to the necessities of the publick.

“ Again;

“ Again; one of the most useful employments in any state, but which it never has been usual to encourage by motives of emulation, is *agriculture*: now this would flourish much more, if rewards were publicly established in different parts of the country and the villages, for those who shewed the greatest skill in the cultivation of their land; and from thence great advantages would accrue to those individuals who diligently applied themselves to their occupation: the publick revenues would be greatly augmented; temperance and sobriety would attend this laborious occupation, as vice and immorality seldom spring

spring up amongst those who are constantly employed.

“ If, likewise, trade or commerce is advantageous to the common-wealth; if he were to be the most honoured, who applied himself with the greatest diligence to trade, the number of merchants would be increased in proportion. And if it were publicly made known, that he who should discover any new method of increasing the publick revenue, without detriment to individuals, should be well rewarded; neither would this kind of speculation be so much neglected.

“ In short, if, in every branch of science, it were made manifest, that no one who discovered or introduced any thing

thing useful to the state would be unrewarded, this consideration would excite numbers to apply themselves strenuously to make such discoveries. And when many rival competitors for this honour were thus constantly employed in the service of the publick, a greater number of useful discoveries must necessarily be made.

“ But if you are apprehensive that all these prizes and rewards should be attended with too great expence, consider, O Hiero! that there are no commodities that cost less than those which are purchased by this means. Do you not see, every day, to what vast expence, to what cares and toils, men submit, for a very trifling reward, in
the

the chariot-races, the gymnastick exercises, and in the musical contests between the several choirs?"*

CHAP. XX.

‘WHAT you observe, my Simonides, is extremely reasonable,’ said Hiero; ‘but, in regard to the troops which I have in pay, can you give me any advice how to render myself less odious to my subjects on that account? or, would you say, perhaps, that if a prince could make himself beloved, he would have no longer need of guards.’

* At the publick festivals and solemnities.

“By

“ By no means,” replied Simonides, “ he certainly would still want guards. For, I am sensible, it is with some men, as with some horses, the more plenty they have, and the better they are fed, the more fierce and unmanageable they are. Now nothing can keep in awe these turbulent spirits, but a strong military force, such as you now employ.

“ As for the virtuous and peaceable citizens, you cannot, in my opinion, do them a greater service, than by maintaining these troops in your pay. You maintain these mercenaries, 'tis true, as guards of your own person: but, it frequently happens, that the masters have been massacred by their slaves.

slaves. You ought, therefore, particularly to give it in charge to your guards, to consider themselves as the protectors of the citizens *in general*; and to give them immediate assistance, if ever they perceive them forming any such dangerous designs against them. For there are (as every one knows) in all cities those desperate villains, over whom, if your *guards* are ordered to keep a watchful eye, the citizens, in this respect, would acknowledge their utility.

“Further yet, your troops may probably give protection and security to the labourers and to the cattle in the country; not only to your own private possessions, but to the proprietors in
general.

general. And, likewise, by guarding certain advantageous posts, leave the citizens at leisure to attend their private affairs in the utmost tranquillity.

“Add to this, that to discover and prevent any secret and sudden irruption of enemies to the state, who can be more alert or more ready at hand, than such a standing force, always under arms, and united in one body? And, in time of war, what can be more useful to the citizens, than these mercenary troops? For it is natural to suppose, that they will be more willing to undergo fatigue, and to expose themselves to danger, and more vigilant for the publick good.

“In

“ In fine, the neighbouring states must necessarily be more desirous to live in peace with those who have constantly an armed force on foot; for these regular troops have it most in their power to protect their friends, and to annoy their enemies.

“ Now, if your subjects are convinced that these forces never injure those who do no injury to others; but, on the contrary, keep in awe the turbulent, and assist those who are unjustly oppressed; watch over and expose themselves to danger for the publick good: how can they avoid contributing with pleasure to their support? At least they often maintain
guards

guards at their own private expence
for things of infinitely less moment.

CHAP. XXI.

“IT is necessary likewise, Hiero!
that you should contribute cheerfully
part of your own revenues for the ser-
vice of the publick. For it appears to
me, that what a king lays out for the
publick, is more usefully bestowed
than what he spends on his own pri-
vate account. Let us consider the
affair more minutely. Which of the
two, do you imagine, would be most
to your credit;—a palace, built in an
elegant style, at an enormous expence,
H for

for your own use; or to adorn the whole city with publick edifices, walls, temples, porticoes, squares, and harbours? Or which would make you more formidable to your enemies;—to be adorned yourself with the most splendid armour, or to have the whole city completely armed?

“ Or, which do you think the most probable method of augmenting your revenues;—by managing to advantage your own private property alone, or by contriving by what means the industry of the whole city may turn to the best account?

“ As the breeding horses for the chariot-race is esteemed one of the most noble and most magnificent amusements

amusements for a prince, which do you suppose is most honourable;—that you* alone should provide and send to the publick games more chariots than all the rest of Greece; or, that the greatest part of your subjects should breed horses and contend for the prize at those games? Which do you deem the most noble;—the superiority which you gain over others in the managing your chariot; or that which you acquire by making happy the city over which you preside?

“ For my part, Hiero! I think it by no means consistent with pro-

* Hiero, it is well known from the Odes of Pindar, was particularly attached to the Olympick games. See West's and Banister's translations of Pindar.

priety, or even decent, for a prince to enter the list with private persons; for, if you are victorious, you would be so far from being applauded, that you would incur the odium of the publick, as having supplied the expences of your victory from the substance of many wretched families. And if you were vanquished, you would be exposed to more ridicule than any private individual.

“ But, if you would listen to me, Hiero, permit me to advise you to enter the lists against the governors of other states: and if you can render the city, over which you preside, more happy than those, you may be assured, that you obtain the victory in the most
noble

noble contest in which a mortal can engage.

“ And, in the first place, you will succeed immediately in the grand object of your ambition, the gaining the love of your fellow-citizens: and, in the next place, this victory of yours will not merely be proclaimed by a single herald, (as at the Olympick games) but all mankind will concur in celebrating your virtue.

“ And you will not only attract the respect of a few individuals, but the *love* of whole cities; and not only be admired privately, within the walls of your own palace, but publicly, and by the whole world.

“ You may also, if you desire it, either go abroad to see any thing rare or curious, or satisfy your curiosity though you remain at home. For there will always be a crowd of those about you, who will be proud to exhibit whatever they have discovered, either ingenious, beautiful, or useful; and of those who will be ambitious to serve you.

“ Every one who is admitted to your presence, will be devoted to your person; and those who live at a distance, will passionately desire to see you. So that you will not only be respected, but sincerely and cordially beloved by all men. You will be under no necessity of soliciting the favours of the
fair

fair sex, but must even suffer yourself to be solicited by them. You will not be afraid of any one, but every one will be anxious for your preservation.

“Your subjects will pay you a voluntary obedience, and carefully watch for the safety of your person. And should you be exposed to any danger, you will find them alert, not only to assist you, but to protect you,* and avert the danger, at the hazard of their own lives. You will be loaded with presents; nor will you want friends to whom you may have the pleasure of imparting them. All men will rejoice in your prosperity, and will contend for your rights, as earnestly as for their own.

* Προμαχῶς.

And

And you may consider the wealth of your friends* as treasure laid up for your use.

“ Take courage then, Hiero, enrich your friends with a liberal hand; for by that means you will enrich yourself. Augment the power of the state, for thus you will render yourself more powerful, and secure alliances in time of war.

“ In a word, regard your country as your own family; your fellow-citizens, as your friends; your friends, as your own children; and your children, as your own life: but endeavour to surpass them all in acts of kindness and beneficence. For if you thus

* See Appendix.

secure the attachment of your friends by acts of beneficence, your enemies will not be able to resist you.

To conclude, if you regulate your conduct according to these maxims, be assured, Hiero, you will obtain the most honourable and most valuable possession which mortals can possibly enjoy; you will be completely happy, yet unenvied by any one."



APPENDIX.

NO. I.

RESPUBLICA, res est populi, cum
benè et justè geritur; five ab
unô rege, five a paucis optimatibûs,
five ab universô populô. Cum verò
injustus est rex, quem *tyrannum* voco;
aut injusti optimates, quorûm consen-
sus *factio* est; aut injustus est populus,
cui nomen usitatum nullum reperio;
nisi ut etiam ipsum *tyrannum*, adpel-
lem; non jam vitiosa sed omninò nulla
respublica est: Quoniam non est res
populi, cum tyrannus eam factiove
capeffat;

capeffat; nec ipfe populus jam *populus* eft, fi fit injuftus; quoniam non eft multitudo juris confenfû et utilitatis communione fociata.

FRAGM. 1. 3. *de Republicâ.*

“ A legitimate commonwealth is where the *common-weal* or good of the whole is confulted; whether under a king, an ariftocracy, or a democracy. But if either of thefe act unjuftly, or in defiance of the law, there is no longer a commonwealth; nor are the people properly a people, but a mob; becaufe not united under common laws, or a community of rights and advantages.” This is partly the fenfe, but it cannot well be literally translated.

NO.

NO. II.

TULLY, in his pleadings against Verres, not only calls Syracuse, "maximam Græciæ urbem pulcherrimamque," the largest and most beautiful city of Greece, but is so minute in his description of its harbours, temples, and theatres, and of the statues and pictures of which Verres plundered them, that it seems to have exceeded almost any other city in the world; which is partly confirmed by the ruins yet remaining, as described by Mr. Brydone, Watkins, &c.

NO.

NO. III.

DIODORUS SICULUS calls him φι-
 λάργυρος και βιαίος, covetous and cruel,
 &c. But Pindar, who resided much
 at the Court of Hiero, and has cele-
 brated his victories at the Olympick
 games, speaks of him as a truly vir-
 tuous character. And indeed a man
 that was notorious for any crime or
 depraved morals, could not be a can-
 didate at those games. And the glory
 acquired by a victory in the chariot-
 races, or in the gymnastick exercises,
 or the more liberal arts, history,
 poetry, &c. seemed to supersede all
 other virtues.

The mere English reader, who has
 taken his ideas of the Olympick and
 other

other games of ancient Greece, from what he has seen or heard of our Newmarket sports, or our boxing-matches, which are usually an assembly of gamblers and pick-pockets, attended with every species of profligacy and blackguardism, will be astonished at the veneration in which those games were held by all ranks of people, and the almost divine honours, which were paid to them who gained the prize on those occasions, who were almost literally exalted to the rank of demigods, as Horace has observed:

“Palmaque nobilis

“Terrarum dominos evehit ad Deos.”

Od. i. b. 1.

But these solemn games were originally instituted by the command of
the

the Delphic oracle, to put a stop to a great pestilence, which, with the continual wars between the petty states of Greece, had almost depopulated the country: so that they had partly a religious and partly a political view: as, during these solemnities, even states that were at war with each other were obliged to suspend their hostilities, and join the general assembly of all Greece.

The utility of the gymnastick exercises, to render the body more hardy and active; and of the chariot-races, to encourage the breeding and management of horses,* was indeed in time

* The Greeks were so ignorant, in the earlier ages, of the management of horses, that the fable of the Centaurs, probably, took its rise from seeing some Thessalians on their backs at a distance.

friendship which subsists between us: there can be no friendship contracted, where there is so little connexion or correspondence. All that they say or do is pretence and show: I see nothing around me but disguise and dissimulation."

Lib. i. c. 42.

NO. VII.

I shall conclude these extracts with a short one from Lord Bolingbroke's "Letter on Patriotism." Speaking of superior spirits, whether invested with royalty, or placed in other elevated situations, "They either appear," says he, "like ministers of divine vengeance,

K

geance,

geance, and their course through the world is marked by desolation and oppression, by poverty and servitude; or, they are the guardian angels of the country they inhabit; busy to avert even the most distant evil, and to maintain or to procure peace, plenty, and the greatest of human blessings, LIBERTY."

P. S. I have availed myself of Peter Coste's French translation, but have never adopted an expression without having first examined the original with the most scrupulous attention.

THE END.



M.

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